Incorporating information value into Navy tactical data system system configuration management through the Delphi method by Ketcham, Barbara Lynn
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
Incorporating information value into Navy tactical
data system system configuration management
through the Delphi method
Ketcham, Barbara Lynn












INCORPORATING INFORMATION VALUE INTO
NAVY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT




Thesis Advisor Thomas M. Mitchell
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

classified
ass f catior c' this oare
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Report Security ciassificat or Unclassified Restrict ve K'
Security Classification Author •
,
iteclassification/Downaradma SchedJ'
3 Distribution/Availability o' Report
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
: e rform!ra Ocar zation Repo r t Number s 5 Monitonna Organization Report Numbers]




7a Name of Monitoring Organization
Naval Postgraduate School
Address icty, state, ana ZIP cocsi
onterev. CA 93943-5000
7b Address (city, state, and ZIP code}
Monterey. CA 93943-5000
Name of Funding Sponsonnc Organization 8b Office Symbol
(If ace 1 <cab e
S Procurement instrument Identification Number
Address icity, state, and ZIP coce, 10 Scj rce of Fundnc Numbe r s
P--oc r a r en; No c roiect No WO' Unit A;c?
Title (include security classification) INCORPORATING INFORMATION VALUE INTO NAVY TACTICAL DATA SYSTEM
[M CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT THROUGH THE DELPHI METHOD
SYS-
Perscna; Authorfsi Barbara Lvnn Ketcham








Supplementary Notation The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy
position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
Cosati Coces
sld Subo r o'jp
16 Subject Tern-.s icc r : nue en reverse if necessa ry ana identify by block number)
configuration management. Delphi method. Command and Control
Acstract (continue c r e .e r :e >f necessary a^c identify by c ock number)
There is a difficulty in incorporating information value judgments into configuration management decisions re-
irding command and control systems. This work reviews two command and control process models, decision theory
; it relates to command and control and the current tactical data link configuration management method. The Delphi
ethod is discussed and a means of incorporating its use into configuration management is introduced The Delphi
ethod allows a systematic gathering of subjective information from selected respondents which then enables formu-
tion of a group position. Use of this method would enable subjective assessments, such as perceived operational
ipact of tactical data link changes, to be systematically considered in Navy tactical data link configuration manage-
ent decisions.
Distribute on Availability of Acstract
unclassified/unlimited f~J same as report C DTic use r s
21 Abstract Security Cassificanon
Unclassified
t Name c' Respons ce Ind vidua!
omas M. Mitchell




FORM 1473.64 WAR 63 A"R edition may be used until exhauster.
All other edit.cns are obsolete
security cass ficat on of tms pace
Unclassified
Approved for public release: distribution is unlimited.
Incorporating Information Value Into
Navy Tactical Data System
System Configuration Management
Through the Delphi Method
by
Barbara Lynn Ketcham
Lieutenant. United States Navy
B.S.. Winthrop College, 1979
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY





There is a difficulty in incorporating information value judgments into con-
figuration management decisions regarding command and control systems.
This work reviews two command and control process models, decision theory
as it relates to command and control and the current tactical data link config-
uration management method. The Delphi method is discussed and a means
of incorporating its use into configuration management is introduced. The
Delphi method allows a systematic gathering of subjective information from
selected respondents which then enables formulation of a group position. Use
of this method would enable subjective assessments, such as perceived oper-
ational impact of tactical data link changes, to be systematically considered in
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Difficulty exists when system engineers or evaluators try to determine the
usefulness of information to a corporate or military decisionmaker. As a re-
sult, many systems are designed without evaluating the decisionmaker's value
judgments on the information being presented to him. This is especially true
in the area of military command and control systems. Communications path-
ways and connectivity issues are easier to determine than the specific infor-
mation needs of the commander. This study will present a method to improve
the capability of incorporating information value into Navy configuration man-
agement decisions.
A. BACKGROUND
Current emphasis in military budgeting gives rise to measures of effec-
tiveness equaling a steady budget line. Unfortunately, this view often leaves
the command and control aspect of command, control and communications
unfunded. Since it is difficult to quantify the information needs of the
commander and therefore a value cannot be placed on the absence of the in-
formation, many valid programs fail to get the continued funding they need.
This is exemplified by the delayed fielding of the Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS) hardware which implements the TADIL J message
standard. Originally to be fielded in the late 1970s, the Navy does not antic-
ipate full implementation prior to 1993.
Within the Navy, some attempts have been made to determine the impact
of message translation between two tactical digital data system standards.
TADIL A (Link 11) and TADIL J (Link 16). These efforts, although largely un-
successful, have underscored the need to incorporate decisionmakers' value
judgments into Navy configuration management of these data links. This the-
sis is an effort to meet that need.
B. OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The objective of this study is to identify a method to incorporate various
subjective considerations that should be taken into account when making
configuration management decisions that affect the inclusion or exclusion of
information in a tactical digital data link. It was suggested as a topic by staff
members of the Navy Tactical Interoperability Support Activity (NTISA) which
is chartered by the Chief of Naval Operations to do configuration management
(CM) of the data links under the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command
and Control Systems (JINTACCS) program.
C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The scope of this study includes an evaluation of the command and control
process from the view of the human decisionmaker. This view draws from both
classical and recent research on decision theory. Three C2 process models,
each of which expands upon the other, will be reviewed.
It is a difficult to apply quantitative scales to information value as per-
ceived by the decisionmaker. A method will be introduced which may allow
for CM decisions to be made in a more scientific manner.
D. LIMITATIONS
A thorough evaluation of the existing method used for CM of the Navy's
tactical data links will not be done, but sufficient explanation of the method will
be given to help the reader to understand the development of the CM issues
discussed. To allow for wider distribution of this work and to keep it unclas-
sified, no pending configuration management items will be discussed. Exam-
ples used are of the author's creation and do not represent known CM issues.
The focus of this work is on CM within the U. S. Navy although many of the
concepts may apply equally well to the other military services.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
The author's basic assumption is the Navy does not adequately include the
information value judgments of the decisionmaker in the design and subse-
quent configuration management of tactical data systems. The classical sci-
entific method is applicable when discussing the process of decisionmaking
but does not lend itself to assigning value judgments to a particular piece of
information. This inability to determine "value" within the Navy's configura-
tion management has led to difficulty when determinations have to be made
about whether to include a particular information message into the data link.
As a result, members of configuration management bodies have used various
heuristics to guide their decisions. These heuristics, such as perceived oper-
ational impact, vary from individual to individual. The group then spends
much of its time trying to determine the individual heuristics and compile them
into a group position. This process is fraught with difficulty as the military rank
of the members tends to unduly influence the group position. (Bennett. 1989)
Another method must exist which allows for heuristics to be taken into ac-
count but eliminates the rank structuring of existing configuration management
decision making process. This method should allow for some anonymity by
the CM decisionmakers, allow for a methodical review of issues and be able
to treat non-quantitative problems. This method should also be easy to incor-
porate into the existing configuration management process.
F. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions are given to assist the reader. If no reference is
given, the definition is that of the author.
• Configuration management. A discipline applying technical and admin-
istrative direction and surveillance to:
1. Identify and document the functional and physical characteristics of a
configuration item.
2. Control changes to those characteristics.
3. Record and report change processing and implementation status
(NTISA. 1987. 2-2).
• Command and Control. The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplish-
ment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facili-
ties, and procedures which are employed by a commander in planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the ac-
complishment of the mission (JCS Pub 1).
• Configuration item. A system and its associated standards which need to
be controlled to allow for optimal performance of the system.
G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter Two focuses on existing research in the area of command and
control process, evaluating two current process models. Classical decision
theory is discussed and related to military decisionmaking. It examines the
current configuration management process and relates this to the hardware
and software view of C3 concluding with the author s perspective of the human
role in C2.
Chapter Three discusses the Delphi method and relates it to use in Navy
configuration management with Chapter Four focusing on the implications of
the method being used in CM. The final chapter presents the author's con-
clusions and recommendations and gives suggestions for further study.
II. VIEWPOINTS ON COMMAND AND CONTROL
This chapter discusses various viewpoints that influence the focus of com-
mand and control. Pertinent research on decision theory will be presented.
Two descriptive C2 process models are discussed and contrasted. The chap-
ter concludes with a description and evaluation of the current U. S. Navy
configuration management scheme for tactical digital data links.
A. WHAT DOES DECISION THEORY SAY?
The modern roots of decision theory (DT) can be traced to von Neumann
and Morganstern. an economist and mathematician respectively, who de-
scribed utility theory as a method for determining why people make the deci-
sions they do. A decision analyst uses the six concepts listed below to
evaluate the decisions made by a particular decisionmaker. This evaluation
is used to assist a decisionmaker in acting in consonance with his established







Probability and utility are subjective assignments unique to the decisionmaker
and the situation. Probability, in this usage, is the decisionmaker's determi-
nation of the likelihood of occurrence of the situation. The utility of an alter-
native under consideration is in the mind of the decisionmaker. Decision
theory assumes it must be measurable, at least on an ordinal, if not a cardinal
scale. This measurement would be conducted by a decision analyst but is not
explicitly done by the decisionmaker. The third concept is aggregation: the
decisionmaker's activity which combines the probability and utility of various
alternatives in order to choose between them. Decision theorists group deci-
sion, choice and preference together. An analysis of the probability, utility and
aggregation values of the decisionmaker should lead to a preference among
alternatives with a choice option between alternatives. This process would
then result in a decision being made.
Decision theory researchers do not appear to be bothered by
decisionmakers not always acting in consonance with the judgments, such as
probability and utility, which they assign to the alternatives under consider-
ation. The researchers merely want to identify the logic behind decisions and
help the decisionmakers identify when they are not acting in accordance with
their values. (Hammond. 1980.44-67)
In its recent development, Keeney and Raiffa . . . emphasize the point that the aim
of DT is to elaborate the logical entailments of the subjective probability and
utility theory and extend them to a variety of circumstances. . . . DT makes no
claim that it represents or describes the cognitive activity (or information proc-
essing) of human decision makers. (Hammond, 1980, 43-44)
Decision theorists avoid determinations of what decisionmakers do but fo-
cus instead on the values and judgments which they place on the information
used to make the decision. Extending this to the configuration management
process, one may conclude various alternatives under consideration will have
varying levels of value to the user based on the perceived probability and
utility of the alternative to the commander. Assuming this is true, such infor-
mation value judgments should be considered in the configuration manage-
ment of command and control systems.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS MODELS
Various models have been created in an attempt to describe the command
and control process. This section discusses Lawson's model. Metersky's ex-
pansion of Lawson's model, and then evaluates them in terms of the human's
role in the process.
1. Lawson's view
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Figure 1. Lawsons Command and Control Process Model







1 This section is the author's evaluation of Lawson, J. S.,"The State Variables of a Com-
mand Control System," Proceedings for Quantitative Assessment of the Utility of Command
and Control Systems. Office of the Secretary of Defense with the cooperation of the MITRE
Corporation. C 3 Division (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, Ft. Leslie J. McNair,
January 1980). 93-99.
As described by Lawson. sensing is the gathering of signals in the form
of data from the environment. This data can include radar returns, imagery
reports or reports from human observers. This data is then processed and
external data may be introduced. Processing implies the conversion of raw
data to information which can then be used to compare the existing state to the
desired state.
After comparing, the next function performed is decide. The decide
function can be supported by decision aids and is based on information from
the previous three functions. These decision aids can include automated data
bases which allow the decisionmaker to review historical information about the
situation, graphical plots of units' position, or expert systems which can re-
commend courses of action based on the information available.
The last function is act. The goal of this function is to influence the
environment to produce the desired state as used in the compare function. In
many cases, actions are communicated to higher authorities. Input from
higher authorities may then enter the loop as external data in the process
function.
2. Metersky's view
In 1986. Dr. Mort Metersky of the Naval Air Development Center pub-
lished a paper expanding Lawson's C2 process model. 2 In this he states:
[tjhe C 2 system is a combination of elements that form a complex whoie. This
C 2 system is composed of two inter-dependent parts: 1)a C 2 process consisting
of people, procedures.and organizations and 2) physical components, e.g., sen-
sors, computers, and communications. The major function of the C 2 process is
to provide decision specific information to the responsible decisionmaker,
whereas the physical components provide the mechanism for initiating and im-
plementing the C 2 process. (Metersky, 1986, 880) (italics added for emphasis)
Metersky states there are three perspectives of command and control
systems that should each be evaluated with various techniques from different
2 This section is the author's evaluation of Metersky. M. L. " A C 2 Process and an Ap-
proach to Design and Evaluation." IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man. and Cybernetics, v.
SMC-16. no. 6. November/December 1986. 880-889.
disciplines. These three perspectives are the total system, the C2 process and
the physical components. (Metersky, 1986. 880)
Metersky takes each of the five functions identified in Lawson's model
and expands them to specifically include each subfunction necessary to do the















Figure 2. Metersky's Sense Expansion
In Figure 2 note the explicit representation of the expanded sense function.
As in Lawson's model, the sense function is devoted to assimilation of raw
data from various sources. An additional data set included is the perception
of the enemy's reaction to the action taken. This assimilated data then serves






















Figure 3. Metersky's Process and Compare Expansion
Metersky groups the process and compare functions since both work together
to provide information to the decisionmaker. In both the Lawson and Metersky
models the decisionmaker may be either a human or a machine. Noteworthy
is Metersky's view of the decision requirements of the decisionmaker within
the organizational structure being the driving force behind the compare
method used. Figure 3 refers.
Figure 4 on page 11 shows the expanded version of the decide func-
tion. Within the dotted box, he includes various cognitive factors that affect
decisionmaking by a human. These factors include the decisionmaker s de-
termination of the quality of the input received, human filtering such as expe-
rience, both recent and past history, biases and effects of the environment.
The decisionmaker takes all this information and internally processes it to
come to a decision. The cognitive factors included by Metersky as germane
to the decide function can also be introduced into expert system machines and
10
Figure 4. Metersky's Decide Expansion
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other tactical decision aids, such as Link 11, which can assist the
decisionmaker in his duties.
\
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Figure 5. Metersky's Act Expansion
The last expanded function is act as shown in Figure 5. The subfunction de-
cision command is the translation of a decision into observable actions. The
second subfunction implement decision ". . . concerns the procedures taken
to effect the decision" (Metersky, 1986, 885).
Figure 6 on page 13 combines all the functions and subfunctions into
a whole. He perceives several advantages to his model which include the re-
cognition of humans being involved in the process and identification of specific
information transfer requirements between the various functions and subf-
unctions. Information transfer is specifically shown in various places on Fig-
ure 6. (Metersky, 1986. 887)
3. Where does the human fit in?
Command and control processes, when implemented, can vary from
the fully automated such as one proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative
to the fully manual such as the lone rifleman stalking a target. Most imple-
mented processes or systems fall somewhere in between.
12
Figure 6. Metersky's C2 Process Model
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The system should support the decision and action functions of the
decisionmaker in the partially automated C2 system. To do this, consideration
should be given to the information value judgments of the system user. This
can be done through decision analysis methods as discussed earlier or
through the method proposed in Chapter Three.
C. CURRENT DATA LINK CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The Navy Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems
(JINTACCS) Configuration Management Plan (NJCMP) Revision 1 dated 11
August 1987:
. . . details the initiation, processing, analysis, testing, approval, implementation,
and status accounting procedures needed to control and maintain JINTACCS
message standard baseline and operating procedures within the Navy. The
JINTACCS program includes standards for:
a. Joint Tactical Air Operations (JTAO) (Link 11, 4A, and 14).
b. U.S. Message Text Formats (USMTF).
c. Tactical Digital Information Link (TADIL) J standards for the Joint Tactical In-
formation Distribution System (JTIDS) (NTISA, 1987. promulgation letter).
This section outlines the means by which a hypothetical change proposal
would be evaluated under the existing configuration management (CM) pro-
cedures as described in the NJCMP.
Configuration management under the JINTACCS program includes these
basic elements. Configuration identification is the specific documentation
which supports a particular configuration item. It consists of operational spec-
ifications, technical design plans or related JCS documents and will be main-
tained throughout the lifecycle of the CI. Configuration control is comprised
of three parts:
• formal processing of applicable change proposals
• actual processing and evaluation of the change proposals
• implementation of approved change proposals into the configuration item.
These JINTACCS CM elements are incorporated into Navy configuration man-
agement.
The Navy Tactical Interoperability Support Activity (NTISA) is the CNO's
primary technical advisor for configuration control of the JINTACCS baseline.
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NTISA performs this function through the Operational Interoperability Re-
quirements Group (OIRG) and the Technical Interoperability Standards Group
(TISG). The former group "is composed of representatives from the operating
forces (Fleet CINCs. type commanders, and Commander. Naval Intelligence
Command (COMNAVINTCOM)) "(NTISA. 1987, 3-2). The latter group is prima-
rily responsible for technical aspects of the CIs, including maintenance of the
various operational specifications. Its members include representatives from
the various "software development and life-cycle support activities for the
various tactical data system programs"(NTISA. 1987. 3-2).
1. A Configuration Management Example
Lieutenant Mary Smith is the Tactical Action Officer aboard the USS
CARMEL. a Link 11-capable destroyer assigned to Second Fleet. In the per-
formance of her duties, she observes existing procedures for assignment of
the Net Control Station in the data link do not adequately consider radio
equipment capabilities of the assigned platform. She believes an algorithm
which considers equipment status of the proposed NCS would allow for better
performance of the data link within the battle group. After creating an algo-
rithm that considers equipment status, she drafts a change proposal recom-
mending implementation of her algorithm and forwards it to Commander.
Second Fleet, who is a primary command in the OIRG. via the administrative
chain of command. Second Fleet staff assigned to review the proposal believe
the proposed algorithm is a valid inclusion for Link 11 and forward the pro-
posal to NTISA for status accounting. Second Fleet assigned the change pro-
posal a characteristic of Proposed Operational Requirement, since the current
procedure, although not as effective as LT Smith's algorithm, is functioning
well enough to meet their operational requirements.
Upon receipt of the Proposed Operational Requirement (POR) from
Second Fleet. NTISA will assign it an agenda item number for the next
biannual meeting of the OIRG. It will also be assigned a POR number which
. . . will be composed of the functional area affected by the POR. followed by a
sequential number relative to all PORs proposed in that functional area, followed
by the calendar year in which the POR was drafted (not necessarily the year in
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which originated by the source. Example: ASW-2-/9 is the second ASW POR
drafted in CY-79). TADIL functional areas are "AAW". "ASW", "ASUW", "EW",
or "OPS" (NTISA, 1987. 7-3).
This POR number allows for status accounting of the change proposal as it
makes its way through the configuration management process.
NTISA collects all agenda items and provides a complete package to
each of the OIRG participants at least ten weeks prior to the next scheduled
OIRG. Each participant reviews the agenda items and staffs them with subor-
dinate commands as necessary to come up with a command position on each
item. No procedures are in the NJCMP for the method to be used by the par-
ticipants in doing their internal staffing of agenda items.
At the OIRG meeting, each agenda item will be considered in turn by
the body. Items may be agreed upon by the group with one of five disp-
ositions:
1. Agree with the proposal as written.
2. Agree with the item as amended by the group.
3. Disapprove the item.
4. Continue the item to the next meeting.
5. Withdraw the item at the request of the originator.
If unanimous agreement cannot be reached on the agenda item, the Chair can
rule directly on the item and record the dissenting opinions, create a working
group to attempt resolution, continue the item to the next meeting or some
other specified date or declare the issue to be substantive, which would re-
quire special procedures for resolution. (NTISA. 1987. B-4, 5)
If the OIRG determines the POR is of value and approves it. the agenda
item will be passed to the TISG for action. The TISG reviews the item on its
technical merit and determines its implementation schedule and cost. They
use a method similar to the one used by the OIRG. After the schedule and cost
are delineated, the item is forward to the CNO for approval. NTISA will con-
tinue to monitor the progress of the agenda item through its implementation,
after which the item will become a part of the configuration baseline.
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D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
The previous sections discuss the command and control process and imply
that information within the process has a certain value to the tactical
decisionmaker. If this is the case, one would assume information value would
be an integral part of the Navy CM process. Unfortunately, you will note the
configuration management process as outlined in the NJCMP. a hypothetical
example of which was given, does not explicitly include a method for subjec-
tive evaluation of the value of information content in the data link. The next
chapter describes an explicit method for incorporating these subjective views.
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III. INCORPORATING THE DELPHI METHOD INTO CONFIGURATION
MANAGEMENT
This chapter discusses the Delphi method and gives the author's views on
how it can be incorporated into existing Navy configuration management
processes.
A. THE DELPHI METHOD
Delphi has come a long way in its brief history, and it has a long way to go. Since
its invention ... for the purpose of estimating the probable effects of a massive
atomic bombing attack on the United States, and its subsequent application in the
mid-sixties to technological forecasting, its use has proliferated in the United
States and abroad. While its principal area of application has remained that of
technological forecasting, it has been used in many other contexts in which
judgmental information is indispensable (Linstone and Turoff (eds.), 1975, xix).
1. History
The Delphi technique was developed during the early 1950's for use in
Rand Corporation's study of the "application of 'expert opinion to the se-
lection, from the point of view of a Soviet strategic planner, of an optimal U.
S. industrial target system and to the estimation of the number of A-bombs
required to reduce the munitions output by a prescribed amount.' This ori-
ginal study, sponsored by the Air Force, was titled "Project Delphi". Devel-
oped during this study specifically as a long-range forecasting tool. Delphi has
crept beyond military boundaries and is now used extensively in the private
sector for numerous applications.
2. Method of use
Several different variants of the Delphi technique have been estab-
lished. This discussion will focus on what Linstone and Turoff (1975) refer to
as the "Conventional" approach. They view Delphi ". . . as a method for
structuring a group communication process so that the process is effective in
allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem"
(Linstone and Turoff (eds.), 1975, 3). This process allows for direct communi-
cation of individual ideas and feedback of those ideas to other participants.
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assimilation of a group position, ability for an individual to revise his or her
views and some amount of anonymity among the participants. These features
eliminate some of the negative aspects of group decisionmaking such as
"
. . .conflict, disagreement, and misunderstanding among group members-
[which] are regarded as products of the inability of individuals to process in-
formation consistently and to understand the positions taken and judgments
made by other members about decision issues '"(Guzzo (ed.). 1982. 9).
The Delphi procedure is comprised of various rounds which consist of
participants completing a questionnaire about the issues which are to be de-
cided upon. The participant is usually given two copies of the questionnaire
and is asked to fill out both but return only one. After the questionnaires are
returned to the supervisor they are collated into a group position. On the
successive rounds, this group position is provided to the participants in addi-
tion to the next questionnaire. Several methods are available to the supervi-
sor to use in forming the group position from the individual questionnaires,
but they are beyond the scope of this study. At any time during the rounds,
an individual with an extreme position is asked to give reasons for the answers
given. These answers may also be provided to the other participants during
later rounds. After the selected number of rounds or when the supervisor
determines a group position has been reached, the Delphi concludes. Each
participant is provided a summary of the final conclusions.
3. Drawbacks and Criticisms
As outlined, the Delphi appears fairly straightforward in its application.
However, there is a significant overhead burden to the supervisor and his
team in collecting all the answers and redistributing them to the participants.
Also, the construction of questions for the Delphi is difficult since the supervi-
sor should not attempt to influence the choices of the participants. The journal
Technological Forecasting and Social Change gives many examples of Delphi
applications which show adequate consideration of the former.
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The method is not without its critics, one of the most vocal of whom is
affiliated with the "fountain of knowledge": the Rand Corporation. Sackman
(Rand. 1974) criticized the Delphi on two major fronts, the first of which was
[i]f Delphi is to be treated seriously as a professional technique, it must be judged
by basic, minimum standards applicable to all empirical social sciences (Rand.
1974, 11).
He refers primarily to the American Psychological Association's evaluative
criteria established to inculcate scientific procedures into a field which had a
long history of abuses on the part of test administrators and other researchers
(Rand. 1974. 9). His second criticism was the questionable application of the
technique by some researchers who disregarded basic points such as sample
size, questionnaire construction and reliability of their research. He continues
that evaluative judgments made from improperly constructed Delphi are sus-
pect. (Rand. 1974. 28-68)
After Sackman's critique, almost a complete issue of Technological
Forecasting and Social Change, the leading journal for Delphi research, was
devoted to contradicting arguments (7. 127-233, 1975). The result of this de-
bate appeared to confirm Sackman is correct on his first point but incorrect on
the second. This debate, although more than ten years ago. should influence
the application of any Delphi. Commentary on dissertations using the Delphi
method indicate all researchers are not as thorough as they should be in the
application of the Delphi (Rieger. 1986. 201).
B. HOW IT CAN BE USED BY NTISA
The author proposes a modification of Turoff's Policy Delphi as a prepara-
tion technique for use in the configuration management process. The tech-
nique's use. as proposed, will not eliminate the need for the existing
face-to-face meetings but is intended to standardize the participants' prepara-
tion and focus on explicit consideration of the impact of the proposed changes
on the human decisionmaker. The goal of including this method as a prepa-
ration technique is not for the CM body to evaluate the method by which they
reach a decision on a particular configuration item. It is more the subjective
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assessments of the participants regarding the information value of the CI in
question. Turoff describes six steps in the communication process of his Pol-
icy Delphi. They are:
1. Formulation of the issues. What is the issue that really should be under
consideration? How should it be stated?
2. Exposing the options. Given the issue, what are the policy options avail-
able?
3. Determining initial position on the issues. Which are the ones everyone
already agrees upon and which are the unimportant ones to be dis-
carded? Which are the ones exhibiting disagreement among the re-
spondents?
4. Exploring and obtaining the reasons for disagreements. What underlying
assumptions, views, or facts are being used by the individuals to support
their respective positions?
5. Evaluating the underlying reasons. How does the group view the separate
arguments used to defend various positions and how do they compare to
one another on a relative basis?
6. Reevaluating the options. Reevaluation is based upon the views of the
underlying "evidence" and the assessment of its relevance to each posi-
tion taken. (Linstone and Turoff (eds.). 1975, 88)
Each of these six points should be kept in mind when reading the following.
Upon receipt of the agenda items proposed for the next OIRG or TISG
meeting NTISA will prepare a series of questions relating to each agenda
item's possible impact on the data link. Possible questions are included in a
1979 report by Applied Decision Analysis titled An Analytic Characterization
of Navy Command and Control Decisions. Example questions from the Applied
Decision Analysis report and the rating scales suggested by Turoff are in-
cluded at the Appendix. The primary and alternate commands would receive
these questions with the agenda item package. The questionnaire is accom-
panied by instructions such as those of Jones (1978, 99-155). Additionally, the
participants are instructed they may consult with any member of their subor-
dinate staff in determining their answers but the original participant command
representative should complete the questionnaire.
After the initial round, the questionnaires will be returned to NTISA where
they will be compiled. The author recommends that opinions which are away
from the norm be included in the compiled product along with the reasons
given for the answer by the participant. Following Jones, the second round
asks for further elicitation of the issues. The results of the first round are in-
cluded with the questionnaire and other materials for the second round. The
third round would follow the same general procedure with the exception of the
results being provided to the participants at the scheduled OIRG or TISG
meeting. By this point, the participants will be clear on the issues involved
and also be aware of conflicting views.
The author suggests this method not be used directly for issues involving
technical design standards such as how to represent a proposed message in
octal coding but that it be reserved for review of issues which affect the human
interlace to the data link. These issues could range from the determination of
effects from changing an existing message field to discerning the operational
impact of a change proposal to Standard Operating Procedures. The focus
should be on improving the utility of the data link from the perspective of the
decisionmaker.
Turoff suggests a three or four round Delphi may be sufficient if the su-
pervisory team devotes a considerable amount of time formulating the ques-
tionnaire to include all obvious issues, allows participants to add issues to the
initial list and asks for a position, with the participant's reasons for the posi-
tion, on the first round. (Linstone and Turoff (eds.). 1975, 88-92)
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IV. IMPLICATIONS IN USING THE DELPHI
The considerations that enable good decisionmaking remain the same regardless
if the decisionmaker is a corporate executive faced with a problem in production
or a military commander faced with a tactical decision. Each has a responsibility
to analyze the problem and make a decision that will affect the welfare of the or-
ganization (Combined Arms and Services Staff School, 1984. 1).
As noted in the quotation above, the military commander's decisionmaking
responsibilities are to analyse the problem and make a decision. In Chapter
Two. relevant concepts of decision theory were discussed. One primary con-
cept was the inherent value of information to the decisionmaker. Chapter
Three described a method for incorporating information value in CM deci-
sions. This chapter discusses implications of using the Delphi method to in-
clude information value judgments into the CM process.
A. BETTER SUPPORT FOR THE TACTICAL DECISIONMAKER
As discussed in the section on command and control processes, there is
often little consideration given to the "man in the loop" by command and
control system designers. This often results in systems which do not meet the
needs of the user. By including a method explicitly requiring consideration
of the human, the human s information needs will more likely be met. This
point is emphasized by Metersky and Ryder (undated. 2) who state "[f]or ef-
fective task performance, the information displayed must be relevant to the
operator s needs." When the decisionmaker's need for information is met you
may conclude the mission performance of the unit to which the decisionmaker
is assigned will improve.
B. IMPROVED CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The existing CM process does not allow for a methodical evaluation of
non-quantitative issues. As a result, much time is spent trying to determine
the heuristics on which individuals base their CM votes. Through selective
use of the Delphi the OIRG and TISG can spend more time in preparation for
their respective meetings with less time debating minor points and arguing
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over such things as meanings of words during the meeting. Use of the Delphi
should also remove some of the obstacles inherent in group meetings as dis-
cussed earlier. Implementation of the Delphi should result in a more rapid
treatment of agenda items and subsequently, sooner implementation into the
data links.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The author concludes that insufficient emphasis has been placed on the
human's role in the command and control process. The primary focus has
been on hardware and software since those items can be seen and touched.
As a consequence, little emphasis is put on the information needs of the tac-
tical decisionmaker in existing C2 systems which are ostensibly designed to
support him. Various methods, including the Delphi, have been developed to
gather and evaluate expert opinions on subjects which defy quantification
through existing statistical methods. However, these methods are not being
used in the Navy CM process. Incorporating methods such as the Delphi
would improve the effectiveness of a C2 system by considering the information
needs of the human user in its design. This inclusion should result in in-
creased effectiveness of the tactical unit.
A. RECOMMENDATIONS
Consideration should be given to modifying the existing CM procedures to
include the modified Policy Delphi method as outlined in Chapter Three. Al-
ternatively, if the Delphi is not included. NTISA may wish to use the analysis
method outlined in the paper by Applied Decision Analysis (1979) to guide the
agenda item discussions of the OIRG and TISG. Both methods would force the
consideration of the human s information needs.
The author proposes other research to create a Delphi for use in the CM
process described in this study. This Delphi would include actual configura-
tion items under consideration and build on the techniques outlined in Chapter
Three. Subsequent analysis could include polling the participants' opinions
on the execution of the method and comparative studies between Delphi-
preparation and non-Delphi-preparation agenda items regarding ease of
reaching group consensus at the OIRG/TISG meeting.
A second area for further study would be to create a simulation program
for use by NTISA to evaluate independently a proposed change to the data
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link. This program would require the isolation of the proposed change as the
independent variable and would require almost full implementation of the data
link standard into the simulation. The simulation results could be used by the
OIRG in evaluating operational impact of a proposed change and the TISG
could use it as a method to determine technical feasibility of a change.
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APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE QUESTIONS
1. How much time is available for the decision? This is the time from re-
cognition of a decision to the point where an action must be taken.
• Less than one minute
• One minute to one hour
• One hour to one day
• One day to one month
• Greater than one month
2. What is the frequency of the decision? What is the mean time between
recurrence of the decision?
• Less than ten minutes
• Ten minutes to ten hours
• Ten hours to one month
• One month to one year
Greater than one year•
3. What is the quantity of information relating to a decision received by a
decisionmaker and his staff, in terms of the number of bytes per day (or
a Shannon information measure per unit time)?
• Less than ten
• Ten to 100
• Greater than 100
4. What percentage of messages is significantly more valuable than the av-
erage?
• Zero to one percent
• One to ten percent
• More than ten percent
5. How reliable are the information sources? What percentage of the infor-
mation sources are considered reliable?
• Less than forty percent
• Forty to sixty percent
• Sixty to eighty percent
• More than eighty percent
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APPENDIX B. TUROFF'S POLICY DELPHI SCALES
Turoff s Policy Delphi Scales




• A most relevant point
• First-order priority
• Has direct bearing on major is-
sues
• Must be resolved, dealt with, or
treated
Important • Is relevant to the issue
• Second-order priority
• Significant impact but not until
other items are treated
• Does not have to be fully resolved
Slightly important • Insignificant
• Third-order priority
• Has little importance
• Not a determining factor to major
issue
Unimportant • No relevance
• No priority
• No measurable effect
• Should be dropped as an item to
consider
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Turoff s Policy Delphi Scales (continued)




• Low risk of being wrong
• Decision based upon this will not
be wrong because of this "fact"
• Most inferences drawn from this
will be true
Reliable • Some risk of being wrong
• Willing to make a decision based
on this but recognizing some
chance of error
• Some incorrect inferences can be
drawn
Risky • Substantial risk of being wrong
• Not willing to make a decision
based on this alone
• Many incorrect inferences can be
drawn
Unreliable • Great risk of being wrong
• Of no use as a decision basis
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• Will have a positive effect and little
or no negative effect
• Extremely beneficial
• Justifiable on its own merit
Desirable • Will have a positive effect, nega-
tive effects minor
• Beneficial
• Justifiable as a by-product or in
conjunction with other items
Undesirable • Will have a negative effect
• Harmful
• May be justified only as a by-
product of a very desirable item.
not
• justified as a by-product of a de-
sirable item




Turoff's Policy Delphi Scales (continued)
PROBABILITY (LIKELIHOOD) DESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
Very probable
• Almost certain to occur
• Strong indication of this happen-
ing
Probable • Better than a 50-50 chance of oc-
curring
• Some indications of this happen-
ing
Either way • About 50-50
• Could go either way
Improbable • Less than a 50-50 chance of oc-
curring
• Some indications of this not hap-
pening
Very improbable • Almost certain not to occur
• Strong indications against this
happening
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Turoff s Policy Delphi Scales (continued)
FEASIBILITY (PRACTICALITY) DESCRIPTIVE GUIDELINES
Definitely feasible
• No hindrance to implementation
• No R&D required
• No political roadblocks
• Acceptable to the public
Possibly feasible • Some indications this is
implementable
• Some R&D required
• Further consideration or prepara-
tion to be given to political or
public reaction
Definitely infeasible • All indications are negative
• Unworkable
• Cannot be implemented
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